## 2AC

### AT: Biopolitics Good

No link – the affirmative is a criticism of sovereign power, which is distinct – sovereign power is the power to decide between life and death, while biopower seeks to promote and protect life

Roldan, 12 – B.A. in Criminology and Sociology from the University of Illinois, Chicago (Yolanda, “Sovereign Power and Biopower – Foucault,” http://uicsocialtheory.weebly.com/13/post/2012/12/sovereign-power-and-biopower-foucault-yolanda-roldan.html)//bghs-BI

Foucault explains power in depth to his readers. There are five things that he says about power. He says that power is not an object, power is relational, power is productive, and power is intentional. He explains that power can be gained and one way to gain power is by having knowledge. Foucault explains that power is continual and varies. Power is always changing over time. It has matrices of transformation and power is also persuasive. Foucault also says that power operates in a way that helps it reproduce itself. In his piece titled “History of Sexuality,” he tells us about sovereign power. This is the power that gives you the right over the ability to decide between life and death. He also explains that this has turned into the power to expose someone’s life to death. For example, sovereign power could be the power that a president has to send someone to war. He also talks about direct power and indirect power. Direct power is the punishment that a sovereign power is able to enforce. The indirect power is the power that the sovereign power has to expose someone’s life to death. Basically it is the right to take life or let live. One example that I thought of when reading this was our justice system and the death or life sentence. There are some states in our government that have the death sentence. This is the sentence that one receives when they commit a crime so horrible that the judge of that case believes that the criminal deserves to be put to death. In a way, that judge holds sovereign power. He is exercising his right to take a life when he sentences someone to death. He can also exercise his power to let live by sentencing someone to life in prison instead of death. A life sentence is when someone who commits a crime bad enough gets sentenced to spend the rest of their life in prison. Another type of power that Foucault talks about is Biopower. While sovereign power was a way that people in power would take lives, biopower was the exact opposite of that. Biopower is a way that someone can exert complete and total power over someone else. The reason for doing this would be to better promote life. Foucault explains that biopower is needed to protect lives instead of taking them. This transformed the system from the right to take life or let live to the right to foster life. An example that I thought of when reading this was universal health care. Universal healthcare is when a government supplies their whole country with healthcare. With universal health care no one has to pay for health care and no one has to pay for medical services. This is, in a way, the government exercising its right to promote life. If everyone has healthcare and is being taken care of all their medical issues, and the government is paying for it then they are promoting the life of their citizens.

### AT: War on Drugs Good

#### State-based policies to combat drugs structurally fail

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U.S. drug control policy toward the Caribbean has failed to achieve even minimal objectives. Not only is the drug trade as deeply rooted as ever in the area; related violence and illicit drug consumption are on the rise. Changing U.S. priorities could, however, provide an opportunity for new policy approaches across the region. As the United States turns its attention elsewhere, the Caribbean and other countries may be given the flexibility they need to develop integrated alternative policies that take into account the complex socioeconomic challenges they face. It is vital that the spectrum of public debate be broadened, that is, democratized. Government resources should not be used to delegitimize alternative to critical positions, as has been the practice of the U.S. drug control bureaucracy.

### 2AC – USFG CP

#### The entirety of Western politics rests on the state of exception – any action that begins with the State maintains the ability to determine life

Agamben 98 – professor of philosophy at the University of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer, pg. 8-9)

The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of *homo sacer* (sacred man), who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed,* and whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is included in the juridical order || *ordinamento* || solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered the key by which not only the sacred texts of sovereignty but also the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political realm of the West. The Foucauldian thesis will then have to be corrected or, at least, completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not so much the inclusion of zo~in rhepo/is—which is, in itself, absolutely ancient—nor simply the fact that life as such be­comes a principal object of the projections and calculations of State power. Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which the exception everywhere becomes the rule, the realm of bare life—which is originally situated at the margins of the political order—gradually begins to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, bios and zoe right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible indistinction. At once exclud­ing bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested. ‘When its borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the organiza­tion of State power and emancipation from it. Everything happens as if, along with the disciplinary process by which State power makes man as a living being into its own specific object, another process is set in motion that in large measure corresponds to the birth of modern democracy, in which man as a living being pres­ents himself no longer as an *object* but as the *subject* of political power. These processes—which in many ways oppose and (at least apparently) bitterly conflict with each other—nevertheless con­verge insofar as both concern the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity.

### 2AC – Anthropocentrism

#### Sovereign power dictates the modern exercise of anthropocentrism, and our resistance solves the critique

Chrulew, 5

Matthew Chrulew, Monash University; “ON ANIMALS: REVIEWING AGAMBEN, ATTERTON & CALARCO,” THE BIBLE AND CRITICAL THEORY, VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2, 2005, pg. 5-7 //bghs-ms

[Gender modified]

Animal Philosophy successfully accomplishes its goal – to be, as its blurb says, ‘an invaluable one-stop resource for anyone researching, teaching or studying animal ethics’. In assembling these various writings, whose dispersion has too often allowed them to go unnoticed, the editors have provided a means by which the Continental voice can be more fully heard in philosophical debates regarding animals. Indeed, if we take as criteria not simply the presence of concern for animals, but rather the potential for incisive theoretical tools – ethical theories that include the nonhuman, social analytics that see the nonhuman, literary methods that write the nonhuman – we may find the diverse and difficult modes of thought offered to be uniquely valuable sources of insight.¶ This is certainly the case with Giorgio Agamben. A figure of growing prominence in contemporary philosophy, Agamben is a polymathic scholar equally at home in discussions of literature and political sovereignty. Given another decade, you would expect to find his name among those included in Animal Philosophy. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Agamben challenges the metaphysics of being by rethinking becoming – in his case by centring, via Aristotle, the notion of potentiality. Typically, his books are impressive displays of erudition which pose discomforting questions, and The Open, his recent study of the relation between ‘man’ and ‘animal,’ is no exception (Agamben 2004).¶ The Open is a little book with a hefty brief: interrogating Western species humanism at the ‘end of history’. In twenty short chapters Agamben pierces a host of significant figures with his needle-sharp intellect: Bataille, Kojève, Aristotle, Aquinas, Linnaeus, Uexküll, with the most space being for his former teacher Heidegger. But though the list of proper names is imposing and varied, the texts he examines often peripheral, and his compelling prose both dense and suggestive, any sense of superficiality is misleading. Rather, what Agamben has done is clutch together a pack of icebergs. On the surface, these figures all intersect at the faces named ‘human,’ and beneath the waters, that excluded term ‘animal’ trails in all its abject otherness. Through this contact, a sense of catastrophe and hope builds: how might we think beyond the ‘anthropological machine’ these figures represent and examine?¶ This anthropological machine Agamben describes is the mechanism by which Western science and philosophy produces the human by excluding the ‘animal’ of nonhuman species and the ‘animal’ that is in humanity. This ‘anthropogenesis’ is an articulation within humanistic subjectivity of the human subject as human. The political impetus behind this analysis is significant, for it is precisely this anthropological machine which perpetuates the domination of nonhuman species in relations of subjection and destruction. Agamben is not ambivalent about what is at stake: man’s ‘taking on of biological life itself as the supreme political (or rather impolitical) task’ (p. 76). But though many readers may with good reason still desire more emphatic and sustained attention to the current, specific precidaments of animals, it is possible to build on the connections Agamben makes to his earlier work. In Homo Sacer he argues that ‘the first foundation of political life is a life that may be killed, which is politicized through its very capacity to be killed’ (Agamben 1998). This ‘bare life’ that may be killed but not sacrificed is the life of ‘sacred ~~man~~ human,’ and it is central to political sovereignty understood as always already relying on the production of a state of exception. It is in this state of exception or ‘abandonment’ that the ‘bare life’ of homo sacer may be put to death. If the perennial archetype of homo sacer is the Jew, Agamben’s linking in The Open of the anthropological machine to the production of bare life (p. 38) allows us to add to this list the fetus, the infirm – and the animal. It is the same logic of exception of modern, biopolitical sovereignty which produced both the Nazi concentration camps and gas chambers, and the (post)industrial factory farms.¶ Agamben adds his own twist to the significant knot of scholarship attending to the question of animality in Heidegger. As Calarco states in his commentary in Animal Philosophy, ‘Heidegger’s statement concerning the world-poverty of animals is meant to indicate a simultaneous having and not-having of world’ (p. 20). Heidegger uses the image of a ring which acts both to delimit or encircle the animal, and simultaneously open or dis-inhibit its relation with the environment. As Agamben explains, the difference between the animals’ poverty in world and man’s world- forming nature is best understood through the relationship between the human attitude of pro- found boredom and animalistic captivation: Profound boredom then appears as the metaphysical operator in which the passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to human world, is realized; at issue here is nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming Dasein of living man (p. 68).¶ The centrality of animality to human self-definition is here made clear: for what ~~man~~ humanity becomes open to in becoming ~~man~~ humanity is precisely the poverty-in-world of the animal. What is disclosed is animal captivation: ‘The open is nothing but a grasping of the animal not-open’ (p. 79).¶ Agamben crosses philosophy and science with theological (§5) and biblical (§1) tangents, destabilising the God/ ~~man~~ human/animal hierarchy in his own way: ‘perhaps’, he suggests, ‘even the most luminous sphere of our relations with the divine depends, in some way, on that darker one which separates us from the animal’ (p. 16). Messianic thought and art intermingle with the Hegelian/Kojèvian ‘end of history’ to provide a sense of apocalyptic, productive change in a time when the anthropological machine is ‘idling’. What Agamben hopes is that in the decline of ‘Historical Man’ we might also destabilise the caesura of the anthropological machine: he evokes the idea that ‘on the last day, the relations between animals and men will take on a new form, and that man himself will be reconciled with his animal nature’ (p. 3).¶ The Open will be of interest to scholars of Heidegger and of contemporary continental philosophy, but its greatest use should be to thinkers working in the field of critical animal studies. Precisely because of his insistence on carefully articulating the philosophical dimensions of political sovereignty and power, Agamben’s work seems productive for contesting our modern anthropological machines in their industrialised, biopolitical executions by helping us towards the means of ‘understanding how they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them’

#### The intersectional approach of the perm is comparatively the best option – otherwise the alt gets coopted

Kahn and Humes, 9

Richard Kahn, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Research at the University of North Dakota, AND Brandy Humes, Masters of Education from the Feminist Approaches to Social Justice in Education program at the University of British Columbia and a Bachelor of Environmental Studies from York University; “Marching Out From Ultima Thule: Critical Counterstories of Emancipatory Educators Working at the Intersection of Human Rights, Animal Rights, and Planetary Sustainability”, 2009, http://www.academia.edu/167063/Marching\_Out\_From\_Ultima\_Thule\_Critical\_Counterstories\_of\_Emancipatory\_Educators\_Working\_at\_the\_Intersection\_of\_Human\_Rights\_Animal\_Rights\_and\_Planetary\_Sustainability //bghs-ms

Despite environmental education’s potential limitations as a critical field of study, significant theoretical inroads have been made over the last 10 to 15 years that have sought to intervene and reconstruct it as an advocacy pedagogy capable of transformatively engaging with the socio-political and cultural contexts of environmental problems. It is thus not altogether uncommon now to hear critical environmental educational theorists speak of the need to either develop pedagogical methods that can work both for ecological sustainability and social justice or mount critique of environmental education from an oppositional variety of racial, class, gender, queer, and non-ableist standpoints. Institutionally, this has translated into the recent emergence of education for sustainable development as environmental education’s heir (Gonzalez-Gaudiano, 2005) along with attempts to blend forms of environmental education with work hailing from the tradition of critical pedagogy (for examples, see McKenzie, 2005; Gruenewald, 2003; Gruenewald & Smith, 2007; Fawcett, Bell & Russell, 2002; Bell & Russell, 2000; Cole, 2007; McLaren & Houston, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2001; Kahn, 2008a; 2008b; 2006; 2002; Andrzejewski, 2003; Gadotti, 2008).2 While some of this work, like that of McKenzie, Russell, Fawcett, and Andrzejewski has been concerned with the need for a critical literacy of nonhuman animals, the majority of the socio-ecological turn in environmental education has either ignored nonhuman animal advocacy issues or has worked only ambiguously on nonhuman animals’ behalf through an attempt to teach non-anthropocentric values. Though deconstructions of anthropocentrism are no doubt useful towards reconstructing educational frameworks, they have however been deployed for different and sometimes contradictory ends by a variety of groups. Hence, a curriculum of deep ecology might critique anthropocentrism in order to establish norms of greater equality between species and to challenge human identities through an attempt to foster biocentric or ecocentric literacies of planetarity. This could work well with outdoor education and other wilderness- oriented pedagogies. Animal welfarist educators, by turn, might promote reformed visions of humanity as a good steward for life on earth and thereby uphold human rights to use nonhuman animals within an ethics that is less imperialist and more paternalistically familial. The curricular model here could question painful or needless dissection exercises in science education or promote the value of using classroom pets to teach character traits of responsibility and non- violence. Yet, neither of these theoretical perspectives, despite whatever positive outcomes they may tend toward, entail the production of knowledge about the ways in which the plight of nonhuman animals is structurally necessitated by our current system of political economy based on exploitative capitalism, violent militarism, and industrial technics. Moreover, they do not demand that we understand the subjugated status of nonhuman animals in our society as related to or concordant with the historical reality of oppressed human groups as well as with the domination of nature generally. Without seeking to limit the multiple pathways that liberatory pedagogy may presently take--that is, we recognize that differences between sociopolitical struggles even as we seek to promote recognition of their common causes--our feeling is that a new paradigm3 of what might be inclusively termed “total liberation pedagogy” is now at hand and beginning to be more fully articulated in the practices of a vanguard of educators. This total liberation pedagogy attempts to work intersectionally across and in opposition to all oppressions (including those of nonhuman animals) and for ecological sustainability. Producing what Haraway (1988) has called “situated knowledges,” total liberation pedagogy may in any given instance favor analysis of the primacy of one social antagonism over another, or one set of antagonism over the others, in generating inequalities of power and privilege. Again, there is still room for the application of ecofeminist educational theory, for example, and it need not give way to the universalization of vegan Third World ecofeminist anticapitalist Queer disability (etc.) pedagogy, no matter how much we might welcome the latter.4 But total liberation pedagogy, following the advances of multicultural educational theory, views oppression in systematic and complex terms, what Collins (2000) has termed the “matrix of domination.” This not only allows for a more refined analysis of the ways in which power circulates throughout nature and culture, to the systematic advantage of some and disadvantage of others, but by increasing the number of epistemic standpoints from which to teach and learn we free a potential multitude of educational subjects from the culture of silence generated by the dominant mainstream pedagogical and political platforms. To backtrack, save for perhaps lacking a strong commitment to the moral challenge that society’s treatment of nonhuman animals now poses for robustly democratic educational theory, those taking the socio-ecological turn in environmental education already tend to integrate intersectionality into their analyses. What distinguishes total liberation pedagogy, then, is its normative requirement that we also educate against what intersectional social psychologist Melanie Joy (2008) calls, “arguably the most entrenched and widespread form of exploitation in human history: speciesism” (p. 17). This would be to go beyond, for instance, teaching non- anthropocentric values. For by developing educational platforms that illuminate the socially- constructed nature of “species,” total liberation pedagogy does not seek to just destabilize human power in the abstract, but roots this in the need to support cultural and political practices that actively seek to overthrow speciesist relations across society.

### 2AC – FW

#### Their complaint is with the form rather than the content of the 1AC – translating this complaint into a rule plays into sovereign hands which turns decisionmaking and guts education

Steele 10 – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas

(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 109-111, dml)

The rules of language and speaking can themselves **serve to conceal truth** in world politics. I begin here with the work of Nicholas Onuf (1989), which has inspired constructivists to engage how “language is a rule-governed activity” (Wilmer 2003: 221). Rules help construct patterns and structures of language exchanges, and “without these rules, language becomes meaningless” (Gould 2003: 61). From the work of Onuf, we recognize that rules **do more** than set appropriate boundaries for language, as the ¶ paradigm of political society is aptly named because it links irrevocably the sine qua non of society— the availability, no, the unavoidability of rules— and of politics— the persistence of asymmetric social relations, known otherwise as the condition of rule. (1989: 22) ¶ **Rules lead to rule**— what Onuf (1989) titles the “rule-rules coupling.” Thus, linguistic rules **demarcate relations of power** and serve to **perpetuate the asymmetry** of social relations. The structure of language games is valued because it provides order and continuity. But because those rules are obeyed so **frequently** and **effortlessly**, they are hard to recognize as forms of authority. ¶ Where does the need for such continuity arise? As mentioned in previous chapters, Giddensian sociology suggests that the drive for ontological security, for the securing of self-identity through time, can only be satisfied by the screening out of chaotic everyday events through routines, which are a “central element of the autonomy of the developing individual” (Giddens 1991: 40). Without routines, individuals face chaos, and what Giddens calls the “protective cocoon” of basic trust evaporates (ibid.). Yet, as I have discussed in my other work (2005, 2008a) and as Jennifer Mitzen notes (2006: 364), rigid routines can **constrain agents in their ability to** **learn new information**. This is what the rhythmic strata of aesthetic power satisfies. In the context it creates for parrhesia, these routines, connected to an agent’s sense of Self, **shield that agent from the truth**.4 “The shallowness of our routinized daily existence,” Weber once stated, “consists indeed in the fact that the persons who are caught up in it do not become aware, and above all **do not wish** to become aware, of this partly psychologically, part pragmatically conditioned motley of irreconcilably antagonistic values” (1974: 18). The need for such rhythmic continuity spans all social organizations, including scholarly communities (thus we refer to such communities as “disciplines”). ¶ The function of these rules creates a similar problematic faced by the parrhesiastes who is attempting to “**shock**” these structured rules and habits of the targeted agent. Because the parrhesiastes may find the linguistic rules or at least “styles” or language used by the targeted power to be part of the problem (the notion that one must be “tactful,” for instance), she or he must perform a balancing act between two goals. **First,** the parrhesiastes must **challenge the conventions** that serve to simplify and even conceal the truth the parrhesiastes is speaking. **Second,** the parrhesiastes **must observe** some of these speaking rules, part of which may themselves be responsible for or derivate toward the style of the Self that needs to be challenged by the parrhesiastes. Favoring the first, the parrhesiastes is prone to being ignored as irrational, as someone “on the fringe” or even unintelligible or, in the words of Harry Gould already noted, “meaningless.” Favoring the second moves the parrhesiastes away from the truth attempting to be told or at least obscures the truth with the language of nicety. As developed by Epicurean philosopher Philodemus, parrhesia existed within this spectrum: at times, it bordered on “harsh frankness” that was “not mixed with praise”; at other times, the frankness was more subdued (Glad 1996: 41). 5 As the examples of Cynic and academic-intellectual parrhesia provided later in this chapter illustrate, different manifestations of truth-telling as a form of counterpower occupy different spaces along this spectrum— balancing between abiding by these conventions of decorum and style; the need to provide forceful, decloaked truth; or, in the case of Cynic parrhesia, flauntingly contradicting the conventions altogether. ¶ The parrhesiastes will most likely face charges of the first order (ignoring convention) **regardless of the manner** in which parrhesia is delivered. If, indeed, “the truth hurts” and if the target of such truth cannot deny the facts being delivered, the **most convenient option** for the victim **is to blame** “**the way**” in which the parrhesiastes said something, knowing full well that it was **the substance** of what that person said that was, for the victim, inappropriate or, more to the point, inconvenient.

#### “Resolved” means to reduce through mental analysis

Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 6

(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

### AT: Roleplaying

#### You should be an informed citizen, not the government – they shut down critical thinking and deliberation

Steele, 10 – Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas

(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s **primary purpose** should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must **avoid a trap** into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “**Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, **instead**, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who **plays the role** of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. **What the President needs**, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” **are missing the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “**tact**,” “**rules**,” and **seduction** that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and **no more can reasonably be asked**, for this planet to remain a place **fit for human habitation**” ([1964] 2006: 233).

Michael Ruse doesn't - that Reason is not a game.

## 1AR

#### The war on drugs hasn’t curtailed illegal drug trade

Boesler, 12 (Matthew, reporter for Business Insider's markets desk, and Ashley Lutz, writer for Business Insider's retail section, “32 Reasons Why We Need To End The War On Drugs,” Business Insider, 7/12/12, http://www.businessinsider.com/32-reasons-why-we-need-to-end-the-war-on-drugs-2012-7?op=1)

The 'war on drugs' is insanely expensive In the past 40 years, The US has spent more than $1 trillion enforcing drug laws. Annually, the US spends at least $15 billion a year on drug law enforcement. Globally, over $100 billion is spent fighting the war on drugs every single year. **All that money is** in practice **a complete and total waste** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Since the global war on drugs began, drug use has expanded steadily, the exact opposite outcome the war is meant to effect. There have been nearly no official cost benefit analyses of the war on drugs, leaving the door wide open for all kinds of unexpected harm caused and little accountability.

#### Their epistemology is flawed

Fukumi, 8 (Sayaka, PhD student in International Relations at the University of Nottingham, *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America*, Ashgate Publishing Company, pg. 90-94)

Crime and Violence related to Cocaine The use of violence by traffickers and dealers is a common feature in the cocaine trade. However, some argue that violence in cocaine trafficking is not as high as it is reported by the media. Brownstein maintains that cocaine-related violence is a social construction of politicians, policy-makers and law enforcers through the media in order to promote a drug scare and to encourage public support for the expansion of law enforcement and the contraction of civil liberties.87 Also, Zimring and Hawkins maintain that the cocaine trade may play a substantial role in predatory crime in the United States, yet there is not enough evidence to prove causality.88 Violence seems to play a significant role in the cocaine trade, although some facts reported by the government could have been exaggerated. MacCoun and Reuter identify the potential causes of violence at drug scenes, particularly crack and cocaine, as: the youthfulness of participants; the value of the drugs themselves; the intensity of law enforcement; and the indirect consequence of drug use.89 For the dealers and traffi ckers, violence is a necessary means to protect their business because of its illegal nature.90 In respect to the use of violence in the cocaine trade, according to Goldstein et al, between 1984 and 1988 drug and alcohol-related homicides increased by 11%.91 Among the homicide cases, systemic homicides tripled in 1988 in comparison to 1984, and 88% were related to either cocaine or crack dealings.92 The increase of systemic homicides related to the cocaine trade could result from the expansion of the cocaine market as well as the Colombian distribution networks. At the higher levels of the cocaine distribution system, the cell managers of the Colombian cartels apply violence as punishment and as warnings. Fuentes believes that: ‘A respected manager with the effective use of violence tends to have less betrayal by both customers and workers.’93 For the cell managers, violence is a tool to keep order and enforce the rules to operate their transaction successfully. The individual dealers at the lower levels of the cocaine distribution system use violence in the same manner to ensure payment from customers and to protect their own turf. At the street level dealings of cocaine, dealers purchase the drug on either a ‘cash’ or ‘consignment’ basis through their own networks.94 Making deals in this manner often is a cause of violent disputes over the payment because the customers fail to return with the rest of the payment by the agreed date. This kind of operation through loose individual connections with weak hierarchical structures is known as the ‘freelance model’.95 Curtis and Wendel describe the characteristics of cocaine dealing in this manner as: Freelancing tends to be the most visible, disruptive, and violent form of market organization. Socially bonded organizations are based on social ties, such as kinship, ethnicity, and neighborhood. They are held together by personal relationships, are often discreet about their sales practices (for example, they tend not to advertise drugs openly in the street), and are often less violent and disruptive to their communities than are other types of drug-dealing organizations.96 The lack of ties between individual dealers and the community to which they belong made them indifferent to others, and apply violence frequently. Therefore, Goldstein concludes that homicides in the drug scene are more likely to be a result of ‘illicit drug market disputes rather than psychopharmacological effects of crack’.97 Turning to the relationship between law enforcers and some local communities, there are conflicts between them, particularly within inner-cities. This is because the local people have felt abused by the law enforcers. It relates to the anti-loitering laws that give the law enforcement agents the right to arrest suspected drugrelated offenders based solely on profiles. Impressions from the profi les can be largely infl uenced by personal beliefs and values. As Glasser and Siegel point out, this operation contains the danger of twisting the facts with prejudice residing in officials.98 It creates the risks of cocaine related arrests being the result of prejudice in the law enforcement agents.99 For example, since there is a perception that the cocaine trade is largely controlled by the Hispanic and black population, there is prejudice against these minority groups. The prejudice has shaped particular trends that do not fi t the profi le of American cocaine use. The controversy in the trends is that the majority of cocaine users are white middle-class suburbanites and the majority of cocaine arrests are unemployed black males.100 Due to such prejudice in the law enforcers, in some inner cities, such as Baltimore, more than 50% of the black male population between the ages of 18 and 35 were imprisoned.101 Furthermore, in 1989, black and Hispanics constitute 92% of all those arrested as drug offenders, although government statistics show that blacks constitute only 15–20% of US drug users.102 Arrest without warrant based on police suspicion of cocaine dealing may be effective to capture people, but at the same time, it can increase distrust of law enforcement enforcers. Such sentiment can increase hostility toward law enforcers. McCoun and Reuter argue that the dispute between the communities and law enforcers is evident because the ways in which some police officers treat cocaine offenders were so inhumane that conflict between inner-city citizens and the police emerged.103 It is likely that the cocaine scene is associated with violence by the traffi ckers to protect their deals, although the frequency and level of violence could vary. McKenan reports that hostility and violence against the police is so fierce that no police officers can enter some areas.104 Following the absence of offi cial law enforcement mechanisms, the areas tend to be ruled by the drug traffi ckers. Under such circumstances, there are possibilities that bystanders will be the victims of shootings between cocaine traffickers.105 Although there are cases of violence in some areas, it usually targets particular people, such as traitors to the traffi cking organisations, and politicians and law enforcers acting against traffi ckers’ interests. The possibility of cocaine users getting involved in violent crime, such as homicide, is low, but usually they are more likely to be involved in property crime and theft in order to obtain fi nancial resources to use drugs.106 The neighbourhood of the areas with large numbers of cocaine users suffer from higher rates of petty crime, such as burglary and theft. The police are reluctant to answer non-drug related cases when they are called. As a consequence, statistics released by the Los Angeles Times state that ‘only about 47% of all slayings from 1990 and 1994 were even prosecuted in Los Angeles County, compared with about 80% in the late 1960s.’107 This approach appears to be over emphasising the drug related cases and neglecting other criminal cases. In addition to the insecurity arising from the increase of violence associated with cocaine traffi cking, the government has been seriously concerned about the harm to health posed by the use of cocaine. The number of cocaine users peaked in the 1990s, and then started to decline.108 Following the trend of decline, according to reports from the DEA and ONDCP, the statistics indicate that cocaine users (including both heavy and casual) remain about 2.4% of the total population.109 The health problems related to the cocaine trade are more likely to be caused by the related activities of the cocaine addicts, such as prostitution. Therefore, the high HIV positive rates among US cocaine users have been regarded as a consequence of needle sharing since other developed countries in which the government offers harm reduction programmes110 register lower rates.111Some cocaine addicts tend to engage in prostitution to support their habit.112 Through these, the cocaine addicts may spread infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and other sexual diseases to the community. For example, Colorado Springs, which is known for high infection rates of HIV in the community, has a large number of prostitutes and injecting drug users.113 According to the research by Neaiguset al., the sample of injecting drug users contained 40% HIV seropositive, a disease that is transmitted by syringe sharing and sexual behaviours.114 These studies indicate that the existence of a large community (network) can trigger the rapid spread of HIV. There are also dangers to health associated with cocaine use. However, the harm of actual cocaine use (such as instant addiction and death), according to Baum, has been exaggerated by the government.115 There are certainly health problems caused by the frequent use of cocaine. Those consuming cocaine excessively over long periods of time may experience paranoia, hallucinations and physical damages, and also tend to become aggressive.116 Cocaine is not a physically addictive substance like opium, and normally death is caused by an overdose. The media has sensationalised information related to cocaine and crack by showing ‘crack babies’ being ‘addicted’ to cocaine in their mother’s womb.117 In reality, the infl uence of cocaine on unborn babies has yet to be proved.